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ABSTRACT
A comparison of house prices brought by English auctions and
private negotiations produced evidence that the pricing mechanism
matters, with the price maximizing choice a function of the level of
market interest. In an active market for middle- to high-priced
houses, auctions extracted higher prices than private negotiations.
However, this result did not hold for houses expected to attract
relatively low levels of interest.
IV
A COMPARISON OF HOUSE PRICES BROUGHT BY ENGLISH
AUCTIONS AND PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS IN MELBOURNE
Kenneth M. Lusht
The question of whether pricing mechanisms matter was opened by Vickrey
(1961), who demonstrated that standard auction formats should produce equal
revenues under a set of strong assumptions. Since then, considerable effort
has been put into the problem of how auction revenues would rank if one or
more of those assumptions were relaxed. Recent surveys are found in
McAfee and McMillan (1987a) and Wilson (1992). Kagel (1991) reviews
experimental research.
Less attention has been paid to comparisons of expected revenues from
auctions (in general) to expected revenues from alternative pricing
mechanisms, despite the large number of markets which offer such choices.
Empirical work has been limited to comparisons of prices brought by private
negotiations and sealed bid auctions, despite the fact the English auction
format (open, ascending bids) dominates the use of sealed bids worldwide
(estimates of a 3/1 ratio [Cassaday, 1967] are now probably conservative).
Most of these studies have involved bond underwritings, with reasonably
consistent results. Sealed bids produce lower costs for bond issuers than do
private negotiations, 1 with the size of the difference related to the level of
market interest (Kessel, 1971; Hopewell and Kaufman, 1977; Sorensen, 1979;
This study was presented in the Urban Research Program seminar series. It was funded
by a grant from the National Association ot Realtors with administrative support
provided by the Royal Melbourne lnstitiute of Tchnology. The paper benefited from
discussions with Kalyan Chatterjee and Pat Hendershott and comments from Ed
Coulsen, Norm Miller and Peter Colwell.
1 This result is uncomfortable though, because in practice most bond issues are
negotiated. Agency problems and differences in the expected variance of bids are
possible explanations (Bhagot and Frost, 1986).
2Gilley and Karels, 1981; Bhagot and Frost, 1986). Price has also been
positively associated with the level of interest in the awarding of military
contracts (Yuspheh, 1976), and in the auction of failed banks (Giliberto and
Varaiya, 1989).
This study compares prices brought by auctions to prices brought by private
negotiations in a Melbourne, Australia, housing market. It is the first
comparison of this kind in a market for real assets, and is also the first
comparison of the outcomes of English auctions and private negotiations.
Three propositions from bargaining theory are tested: 1) auctions should
bring different (higher) prices than private negotiations; 2) prices should be
associated with the level of market interest; and 3) prices should be associated
with the level of seller patience. For the most part, the results support
expectations. Average prices from auctions were higher than those from
private negotiations, except for houses expected to attract relatively low levels
of market interest. Ex ante measures of the levels of seller patience and
market interest were also positively associated with price.
Section I describes the Melbourne housing market and compares its
institutions to those that theory would suggest to the revenue maximizing
seller. Section II discusses the data and methodology. An analysis of the
results is in Section III. Section IV is the summary and conclusions.
I. The Melbourne Housing Market
A. Description
In most real estate markets, almost all non-distress sales of residential
properties occur as a result of private negotiations. Scotland is an exception,
as is Australia, notably Melbourne, where the English auction system coexists
with private negotiations, hi Melbourne, the percentage of residential
properties sold by auction increased during the 1980s, most rapidly from
1983 through 1989. Classified advertising in newspapers indicates that about
50 per cent of detached houses were listed for sale by auction in Melbourne in
1988, compared to about 25 per cent in 1983 (Maher, 1989). Of those listed
for sale by auction in 1988, most were sold that way. The remaining were
sold privately either prior to the auction date, or after the auction if the
reservation price had not been met, or were withdrawn from the market.
3The popularity of auctions varies spatially, and as a function of general
market conditions. They are generally favoured during periods of strong
demand, with the highest ratio of auctions to private sales occurring in the
affluent suburbs located within 10 miles of the central business district.
During the 1980s there was also a smaller increase in the percentage of
properties listed for sale by auction in less affluent markets.
The mechanics of an auction sale are straightforward. The listing agreement
specifies the date of the auction (by law the sale must be held within 45 days,
with almost all sales scheduled four to six weeks after the listing), an
advertising schedule and costs, and the commission agreement. Commissions
are regulated. They are based nominally on a sliding percentage of the selling
price, but effectively are 2 per cent plus $660 for all but the lowest-priced
properties. This percentage is the same for both auctions and private sales. A
'for-sale-by-auction' listing requires the seller to pay advertising costs, which
average 1 per cent of the selling price. For a private listing, advertising costs
average V4 per cent of the selling price, and they are generally paid by the
agent (broker). Thus with auction listings, agents save direct advertising costs
and they may also profit by purchasing advertising space wholesale and
charging individual house sellers at retail.
The listing agreement also includes what is referred to as a reservation price.
However, while the existence of this price is public knowledge, the price itself
is not, and it may be changed in either direction during the bidding. Thus the
reservation price is simply a right of refusal.
Between the dates of the listing and the auction, subagents (salespersons) and
agents perform duties similar to those associated with a private sale. The
property is advertised and shown to individuals and by open house, and
prospective buyers are contacted periodically. A seller may or may not
choose to entertain offers for a private sale before the scheduled auction.
The auction is generally held at the property, and is conducted either by an
independent auctioneer paid a fee for his services (typically $100-$200), or
more commonly by an agent or subagent of the listing firm. The skills
required tend to limit those qualified and interested in auctioneering, and
there is a measure of status afforded auctioneers within the industry. If the
4bidding reaches a level acceptable to the seller, the property is sold. During
an auction, it is common practice for the auctioneer to interrupt the bidding
to consult privately with the seller. This occurs most often when bidding has
slowed. The auctioneer then returns with fresh instructions as to a minimum
acceptable price. When a property is sold, a 10 per cent deposit is required
with the balance due at settlement, which is typically 60 days from the date of
the sale. Contingency clauses are almost never found in the sales contracts
that result from auctions, a fact also true for contracts resulting from private
negotiations.
Seller (or dummy) bids are legal and routinely used, and the auctioneer
reminds attendees of this fact prior to the start of bidding. Seller bids may be
made by plants in the crowd or simply taken "off the wall' by the auctioneer.
Some auctioneers
—
generally those who are inexperienced and feel
uncomfortable calling out fictitious bids—employ bidders who follow them
from auction to auction. Agents claim publicly that while seller bids lubricate
the auction process, they do not distort average prices. Privately, however,
some admit to a perception that seller bids produce higher prices. And
though there is less incentive for a seller to bid once the bidding has reached
an acceptable level, this is sometimes done. According to agents, such bids
are made when they are expected to bring higher bids without undue risk.
The risk is that if the real bidder(s) fails to bid again, the seller bid is
revealed. This may alienate the bidder, and at best creates doubt about the
actual second-high bid. The result may be a lost or delayed sale, and the final
price may be lower than the previous high (actual) bid. Agents claim this
scenario occurs frequently enough to serve as a constraint on the practice of
seller bids above reserve.
Properties that are offered at auction but not sold are almost never auctioned
a second time. They are either taken from the market or offered for sale
privately. By law, the agency loses its exclusive right-to-sell thirty days after
a failed auction.
B. Marketing Institutions and Theory
Marketing institutions in Melbourne housing markets are strikingly consistent
with theoretical predictions about the behaviour of price-maximizing sellers.
Auctions are favoured over private negotiations to sell high-quality, relatively
heterogeneous properties, and during periods of relatively high levels of
5interest and rising prices (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom,
1985). The P°PulanV
auctions in Melbourne increased in the 1980s, a
period of strong demand and
rising prices, particularly in the affluent
suburbs. The trend toward auctions
was most noticeable following passage of the
Land Sale Act m 1983, which
shifted the costs of auction-sale title searches
from prospective buyers to the
seller. This made auction sales more attractive by eliminating
a duplication ol
information costs that are borne (indirectly) by the seller
(French and
McCormick, 1984; see also Hausch and Li 1990a, 1990b for extensions
with
endogenous entry and information acquisition).
When it is decided to auction a property, the English format is almost always
used. For the price-maximizing seller, the theoretically proper
choice of
auction format depends largely on whether bidders are assumed to be risk
neutral or risk averse, and on whether bidders values are assumed to be
independent or affiliated. 2 This literature counts two main results. The
English format is preferred with risk-neutral participants and affiliated
bidding, while sealed bids are preferred with risk-averse participants and
independent bidding (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
In practice, the distinction between independent and affiliated bidding is
blurred, and elements of both behaviours affect price-setting. In the case of
auctioning houses, while individual preferences may affect private valuations
and maximum bids, there are also underlying true market values, and
therefore it is likely that information will be conveyed through the bidding
process. Thus, the choice of auction format will depend on which effect
—affiliated bidding or risk aversion—is expected to dominate. This is an
2 The independent (or private) values model assumes each bidder knows with certainty the
value of the object to him, and that this private value is unaffected by the values assigned
by others. The independent values model does relatively better than the affiliated values
model explaining bidding behaviour in markets for non-durable consumption items that
cannot be resold. Relaxing the independent values assumption to allow bidders' values
to be affiliated means that when one bidder assigns a high value to an object, it is likely
that other bidders will do the same. This being the case, the bidding process conveys
information, with one high bid encouraging others. The affiliated values model (of
which the common value model is the polar case) does relatively better explaining
bidding behaviour in markets for durable items that can be resold.
6empirical question, which, judged by the dominance of the English format
world-wide, suggests that affiliated bidding is the answer in most cases. In
Melbourne housing markets, agents estimate a 20:1 ratio of English auctions
to sealed bids.
Preparation for an auction sale involves intensive advertising, with frequent
open houses and individual inspections of the property. The object is to
increase the expected price by increasing the number of bidders and the
information those bidders have about the property (Holt, 1979; Harris and
Raviv, 1981). The empirical results of Nelson (1992), and the experiments of
Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) and Battalio, Kogut and Meyer (1990) show
positive associations between bid levels and the number of bidders.
Though the effect of seller bids has not been analyzed, it is a practice likely to
be associated with higher prices. Seller bids (artificially) increase
competition, conceal the true number of bidders, and help take advantage of
affiliated bidding (Matthews, 1983; Milgrom, 1985; McAfee and McMillan,
1987b). The one apparent anomaly is that while there is almost always a
commitment to a publicly revealed right of refusal, there is almost never a
publicly revealed reserve price. Though this is inconsistent with the notion
that making public all information is to the seller's advantage (Laffont and
Maskin, 1980; Myerson, 1981), it is consistent with seller behaviour in most
markets. (See Vincent, 1989, for an analysis of this anomaly.)
None of this is lost on market participants. There is a perception shared by
sellers, buyers, and agents alike that in this kind of environment, auctions are
likely to produce higher prices than private negotiations (Maher, 1989a).
This perception, however, has not been tested.
II. Data and Methodology
A . Data
To examine the effect of the pricing mechanism, data from the sales of 309
single-family detached houses were obtained from three offices of a property
agent in Melbourne. The sample included all of the sales for which complete
information could be obtained. The transactions occurred from January 1,
1988, through March 31, 1989, within a market area commonly described as
7the inner-eastern suburbs. It is an area of approximately 50 square miles, all
within 10 miles of the central business district. The houses were high-middle
to high-priced, with selling prices from $140,000 to $425,000. The January
1988-March 1989 time period was one of historically high activity in terms
of the number of listings and sales, and one in which house prices escalated
rapidly, especially in the sample market.
Table I disaggregates the sample by type of listing and type of sale, with mean
selling prices and standard deviations for each category.
According to agents, the percentage of sample houses listed for auction
(74 per cent), as well as the percentages of auction listings that sold before
auction (12 per cent), at auction (71 per cent), and after auction (17 per cent),
are representative of the population of listings and sales in the market area
during the study period.
Table I
Listing and Sale Characteristics of Sample
How Sold
Private
At Auction
Before Auction
Private
80
0
0
How Listed
Selling Price
Mean Standard
Deviation
$244,981 ($71 ,829)
Auction Selling
\ Price
Mean Standard
Deviation
0
163 $247,739 ($75 ,709)
28 $233,914 ($73
,
724 )
38 $258,243 ($73 ,918 )
After Auction 0
8B. The Empirical Model
House prices are explained using Equation 1, which is estimated in the linear,
double-log, and semi-log functional forms.
Selling Pricei = f (Pij, C
i — 1 , ..., n
j=
ij, Ai, EVi, N[
y
Lij, Tij, Di, Pati, Inti, LSij)
where
Selling Price! = the observed selling price for the i^ property
Pij = a set of j physical characteristics for the ith property,
including house size, lot size, number of bathrooms, number
of rooms, construction material, the presence of storage
space, and the parking capacity of the garage
Qj = a set of five (0 or 1) condition categories
Ai = the age of the house in years
EVi - 0 or 1 variable indicating whether the house was built
during either the Edwardian or Victorian periods
Ni = 0 or 1 variable indicating whether or not the house faces
north
Lij = A set of seven (0 or 1) location categories
Tij = A set indicating date of sale, divided into five (0 or 1)
quarters
Di = number of days on market
Paq = 0 or 1 variable indicating whether the level of ex ante seller
patience was judged below normal (0) or normal (or above)
Inti = 0 or 1 variable indicating whether the level of ex ante
market interest in the house was judged below normal (0)
or normal (or above)
LSij = A set of four (0 or 1) categories indicating how the
property was listed and sold
The first two columns of Table II list the variables and their expected signs,
most of which are familiar.
9Table II
House Price Regressions n = 309
Linear (Standard Double-Log (Standard
Variable and Expected Sicn Coefficient Error) Coefficient Error)
House Size (sq. ft.) + 29 (9)** .1267 (.0447)**
Lot Size (100 sq. ft.) + 49 (70) .0605 (.0232)**
# Bathrooms + 10866 (4512)* .0690 (.0282)*
# Rooms + 1964 (2887) .0566 (.0781)
Brick (0, 1) + 38860 (15474)* .1335 (.0613)*
Brick Veneer (0,1) + 3344 (13369) .0330 (.0555)
Wood (0, 1
)
-
-278 (7249) -.0138 (.0294)
Shingle (0, 1) - -8939 (7164) -.0485 (.0290)
No Storage (0, 1) - -4068 (5535) -.0118 (.0226)
# Cars + 2671 (3327) .0023 (.0136)
Excellent Condition + 61781 (7613)**
.2038 (.0311)**
Above Average Condition + 20710 (7215)** .0719 (.0294)**
Below Average Condition -
-27651 (6710)**
-.1167 (.0275)**
Poor Condition -
-28171 (6977)**
-.1380 (.0286)**
Age -
-210 (159) -.0229 (.0140)
Period (0, 1) + 10474 (7947) .0347 (.0264)
North Facing (0,1) -
-3620 (5292) -.0027 (.0216)
Best Location
Above Average Location
Slightly Above Average
+
+
+
18881
19815
-108
(9088)*
(6709)**
(6302)
.0709
.0771
-.0001
(.0375)
(.0275)**
(.0257)
Slightly Below Average
Below Average Location
Poorest Location
Sold Second Quarter, '88
Sold Third Quarter, '88
Sold Fourth Quarter, '88
Sold First Quarter, '89
+
+
+
+
-22065
-30898
-36222
25316
25340
26660
55736
(7683)**
(8569)**
(1 1424)**
(7103)**
(6806)**
(7057)**
(7625)**
-.1089
-.1327
-.1767
.1215
.1196
.1157
.2007
(.0308)**
(.0348)**
(.0460)**
(.0289)**
(.0277)**
(.0287)**
(.0313)**
Days on Market
-34 (60) .0093 (.0219)
Patience (0, 1)
Interest (0, 1)
+
+
16287
8256
(6378)**
(5552)
.0741
.0448
(.0261)**
(.0226)*
Private List, Sale
Auction List,
-
-17168 (5585)**
-.0557 (.0228)*
Sold Before
Auction List,
+ 2210 (7730)
.0099 (.0321)
Sold After
Constant
•
-10426
151973
(6940)
(19805)
-.0474
10.7280
(.0285)
(.3210)
** ^ .. . . . ,——
R2 =
F =
Se =
.77
.31.58
$35,872
R 2 =
.76
F = 30.14
significant at 1 per cent level
significant at 5 per cent level
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The default variable for construction is aluminum-vinyl siding. Brick, the
preferred construction, is a house with two layers of brick, while brick
veneer has only one. Period houses are those that were built during the
Victorian or Edwardian periods, and they are expected to bring a price
premium. North-facing houses are preferred for exposure to sunlight.
Because the sample is drawn from older neighbourhoods (the mean age of the
sample houses exceeds 50 years), there are wide variations in condition.
Agents claim that in these neighbourhoods, condition and location often
dominate size as the characteristics of primary interest to buyers. Houses
were placed into one of five condition categories with the assistance of agents.
Category one is the best condition and category three, average condition, the
default. Again with assistance of agents, the location of each house was
ranked from one to seven with category one the best and category four,
average location, the default.
The time period of sale is one of five quarters, beginning January 1, 1988,
and ending March 31, 1989. January through March 1988 is the default
quarter, and prices are expected to rise over time.
The expectation with respect to days on the market is unclear. Prior
measures of the relationship between price and selling time have produced
mixed results (Miller, 1970; Smith and Sirmans, 1984; Agarwal and Phillips,
1985; Kang and Gardner, 1989), and in this case there is only a small
variance in days on the market for houses sold at auction.
Sellers who are more patient should extract higher prices than those who are
less patient, given that the greater portion of any surplus flows to the more
patient participant (Wilson, 1977; Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1988).
Characteristics likely to be associated with ex ante seller patience include
wealth, the portion of wealth tied up in the house, whether or not another
house has been purchased, and personal factors such as family illness, divorce,
and job security. Direct measures of these kinds of variables were not
available. Instead, sellers were placed into one of two categories; either they
were judged to be of normal (or above) patience, or of below-normal
patience. The determination was based on written comments made on listing
agreements and data sheets, or in some cases on the opinions of agents
familiar with the transactions. The bias was toward the normal category.
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Only in what were considered clear-cut cases were sellers put into the below-
normal category. On that basis, 52 sellers (17 per cent) were judged to be of
below-normal patience.
The ex ante level of market interest is expected to be positively associated
with selling price. During the search process, house buyers reveal
preferences to agents and this information is used to select houses that are
likely to be of interest. When houses are listed for sale, agents can use
customer lists and their general market knowledge to judge the likely level of
interest. It is also likely the interest variable serves in part as a proxy for
omitted variables. Conversations with agents suggest that attributes such as
curb appeal' (overall attractiveness), which are difficult to measure and
which do not appear explicitly in Equation 1, sometimes affect their
perceptions of market interest. The strength of the association between
unobserved quality and the level of interest is not known, though in this
sample of above average quality houses it is likely to be weak.
Judgments about the level of interest were in some cases reflected in
comments made on listing agreements and data sheets. When they appeared,
the comments tended to be negative. Based on these comments and on
conversations with agents, the sample was divided into two categories; normal
(or above normal) interest, and below-normal interest. The bias was again
toward the normal category, with 68 houses, or 22 per cent of the sample,
placed in the below-normal category.
The variables of primary interest indicate how the houses were marketed.
There were four joint outcomes possible: 1) listed privately, sold privately 2)
listed for auction, sold before auction; 3) listed for auction, sold at auction-
and 4) listed for auction, sold after auction. Listed for auction, sold at
auction is the default variable.
Given the high quality and the heterogeneity of the properties in the sample,
i .
. ,
^ time, it is expected thathouses listed and sold at auction will bring higher prices than those listed and
sold privately. Expectations are less clear for houses listed for sale by
periods of
Ut
“1?
bef
°7
° r 3fter tHe aUCtl0n
' IntUiti°n suS8ests that during
rapidly escalating prices it seldom makes sense to sell before an
auction, except when the price offered exceeds the seller's expectation of the
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auction price. Given that agents have extensive information about market
conditions, it is reasonable to believe they are able to make credible
judgments about likely prices. Close correlations between auctioneers'
estimates of value and selling prices have been found in auctions of wine
(Ashenfelter, 1989), art (Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1988), and commercial
bank properties (Lusht, 1991).
Thus the expectation is that the prices of houses listed for sale by auction but
sold privately before auction will be no lower than, and are likely to be
higher than the prices brought at auction. Houses listed for sale by auction
but not sold, and then sold privately after auction should bring prices that are
no higher than, and are likely to be lower than prices brought at auction. A
failed auction puts buyers in a stronger bargaining position, particularly if
buyers' valuations are affiliated. If a property is not sold at a high bid of 'x',
it is known that the second highest bid is 'x
-
y', and it is unlikely that
subsequent negotiations will produce a price equal to or higher than 'x'. A
failed auction also induces impatience in both the seller and the agent, the
latter who is now more likely to lose a commission. In the sample, all of the
houses were sold privately within five weeks of a failed auction.
The model does not include contract contingencies. None of the auction
contracts in the sample included contingencies, and as noted earlier, this tends
to be true of the Melbourne market at large, whether a property is sold at
auction or by private sale. In the market from which the sample was drawn,
agents estimated that contingencies were included in less than 1 per cent of the
population of private contracts, and no references to contingencies were
found in the sample data files.
C. Results
Equation 1 was first estimated using the full sample ot houses. The linear and
double log results shown in Table II are similar to those produced by the
semi-log form.
The model is generally well-behaved. Referring to the linear form, the
independent variables explain 77 per cent ot variations in selling prices, and
the equation is significant at the 1 per cent level. The two variables with
unexpected signs —slightly above average location and north-facing— are not
significant.
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The period, days-on-market and age variables have the proper signs but are
not significant. Inspection of the correlation matrix showed some
multicollinearity among the age, period, north-facing and condition variables.
The nonsignificance of days on the market is not an unusual empirical result,
and as noted, in this case it is likely traceable to the fact that marketing time
does not vary much among auction sales.
Sellers judged to be of normal (or above normal) patience extracted prices
that were on average $16,287 higher (7.4 per cent) than prices extracted by
less patient sellers. The difference is significant at the 1 per cent level.
Properties expected to generate at least normal levels of market interest
produced prices that averaged $8,256 higher (4.5 per cent) than the prices
produced by properties expected to generate below-normal interest. The
difference is significant at the 5 per cent level in the double-log model, but is
not significant in the linear model.
The marketing variables have the expected signs. The highest prices were
produced by auction listings sold before auction, followed in order by auction
listings sold at auction, auction listings sold after auction, and finally, private
listings sold privately. The differences between private sales and both sales
before auction and sales at auction are significant at the 5 per cent level. A
private sale produced a price that averaged 5.6 per cent less than an auction
sale, or 4.6 per cent net of the average 1 per cent advertising costs to the
seller.
Houses sold before auction brought a 1 per cent price premium over houses
sold at auction, which in turn brought a 4 per cent premium over those sold
after auction, evaluated at their respective mean sale prices. However,
interpretation ot the differences between auction prices and before or after
auction prices is muddied by the fact that while before and after auction sales
are private, they are influenced by the institutions associated with an auction
isting. Also, the fact that a sizable percentage of the houses offered at
auction were not sold introduces the possibility of an econometric bias
traceable to bidder self-selection, where the probability of bidding on a given
iou.se (and in turn the probability of it being sold) is influenced by its
characteristics (Heckman, 1979). To avoid the problem, before and after
14
Table III
House Price Regression, Selected Variables
d) (2) (3)
Private Listing and Original Model, Plus
. .
Sale, or Auction Interaction Terms for
Original Model Listing and Sale Marketing Forms and
n = 309 at Auction Level of Interest
(from Table 2) n = 243 n = 309
Interest 8,256 5,715
Private List
and Sale -17,168**
Auction List,
Sale Before 2,210
Auction List,
Sale After
-10,426
Interest
x Private Sale
-21,467**
19,142**
21,515
22,557
-48,424**
-46,752**
Interest
x Sale Before Auction
-27,589
Interest
x Sale After Auction 41,781*
R2 .77 .79 .78
F 31.6 30.2 31.7
Auction Price Minus Alternative Price,
Contingent on Interest Level
Sale Sale
Private Before After
Sale Auction Auction
Normal (or Above) Interest 25237 5032 6643
Below Normal Interest -21515 -22557 48424
** significant at 1 per cent level
* significant at 5 per cent level
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auction sales were discarded, leaving in the sample only those
houses that
were either listed and sold at auction, or listed and sold privately.
The top
panel of Table III shows sthe linear coefficients for the variables of primary
interest for the original estimation (Column 1) and the reestimation without
the before and after auction sale 'hybrids' (Column 2).
The conclusions are unchanged. Auctions produced higher prices than did
private sales, and higher levels of market interest produced higher prices.
D. Interactions
Given the fact that the dominant marketing mechanism in Melbourne housing
markets is determined largely by the kinds of properties offered and the
general level of market activity, there arises the question of whether the price
premium extracted by auctions holds generally, or whether there are
interactions at the micro level between the marketing mechanism and
transaction-specific characteristics such as the size or condition of the house,
or the levels of seller patience and market interest.
The nature of the sample makes the statistical strength of any association of
price to interactions of physical or functional characteristics and marketing
variables an empirical question. That is, because all of the sample houses are
middle- to high-priced, the characteristics of individual houses may
systematically exceed the minimum heterogeneity or quality hurdle for an
auction to produce a price premium.
With respect to interactions involving seller patience, Milgrom (1985) shows
that a seller who is in a weak bargaining position relative to potential buyers
can do as well as a strong bargainer by conducting an auction. It follows that
an impatient seller (a relatively weak bargainer) should do better by auction
than by negotiation. Apparently, however, this outcome is not obvious to
house sellers in Melbourne. In the sample, 24 per cent of patient sellers and
32 per cent of impatient sellers listed for sale privately. Thus while theory
predicts higher prices for impatient sellers through auction, in this case
market behaviour suggests indifference.
With respect to interaction terms that include the level of market interest, the
results of the initial model estimation support the accepted notion that auctions
should produce higher prices than private negotiations in normal (or above)
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interest markets. The expectation for below-normal interest properties is less
clear. While it does not necessarily follow that if auctions produce higher
prices for normal or above interest properties, they will then produce lower
prices for below-normal-interest properties, this seems to be the expectation
in markets where auctions are used primarily to market low-interest
properties. Auctioneers in the United States commonly predict auction prices
for problem properties that are 10 per cent-30 per cent below market (or
appraised) values, and discounts of this magnitude have been found in the
auction of distressed residential lots (Gau, et. al. 1991). Sorensen’s (1979)
comparison of the issuing costs of municipal bonds, though from a different
kind of market, provides some insight. Lower net costs were obtained by
negotiation when market (bidder) interest was relatively low, while lower
costs were obtained by competitive bidding when market interest was
relatively high. This is the kind of result expected here.
The sizes of the marketing mechanism subsamples (n = 80, 28, 163, and 38
respectively for sales that were private, or before, at, or after auction) do not
permit the strategy of combining each of the marketing variables with all of
the other variables in a single model, allowing the data to determine which
interactions matter. Instead, a number of specifications were tried with
various combinations of terms that combined the marketing variables with
other variables that included house size, lot size, age, period, location, time of
sale, seller patience, and market interest.
The only interaction terms that were significant at the 5 per cent level in a
majority of the specifications were those that included the level of market
interest, and they were included in the final specification. The linear
coefficients for selected variables are shown in the top panel of Table III,
Column 3. The bottom panel of Table III is a contingency table that shows
average price differences between auctions and alternative mechanisms as a
function of whether the property was expected to attract normal- or below-
normal interest.
Clearly the marketing mechanism matters for normal (or above) interest
properties. For below-normal interest properties, the results are mixed.
There are no significant differences between auction and private sale prices,
or between auction and before auction sale prices. However, the difference
between auction and after auction sales for below-normal interest properties
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is significant, and is much larger than the differences for any other marketing
form, regardless of the level of interest. The phenomenon of a sharp drop in
price after a failed auction has been observed in other markets (Ashenfelter,
1989), likely the result of a strengthening of the bargaining position of
buyers.
The finding that the price premium extracted by auctions is not contingent on
the level of seller patience is puzzling, though again, apparently not surprising
to sellers, recalling that 24 per cent of patient sellers and 32 per cent of
impatient sellers listed for sale privately. One explanation is marketing time,
with impatient sellers listing privately in order to sell quickly or to ensure a
target date. But this seems a weak argument, given that an auction must be
held within 45 days, and the fact that an auction listing does not preclude a
sale before auction. Ex post, the average time on the market was 35 days for
auctions, 42 days for private sales. Two other explanations seem more
plausible. First, following Chatterjee and Samuelson's (1988) model of
bargaining with incomplete information, it may be that because negotiations
in this market are conducted by agents, the fact of seller impatience is masked
in a sufficient percentage of cases to produce approximately the same average
result as is obtained through auctions. Second, there is the lack of
commitment to a reserve price and the practice of periodically halting the
bidding while the auctioneer and seller confer about pricing strategy. These
are institutions that introduce elements of bargaining into the auction process,
perhaps eroding the protection offered by auctions to relatively weak
bargainers.
E. Is the Marketing Choice Endogenous?
If the marketing choice is endogenous, the interaction results do not provide
much insight into which, if any, variables may be driving the choice. The
only terms that tended to be significant were those that included the level of
market interest, and as in the case of seller patience, there is evidence that the
perceived level of interest did not affect the choice of listing. That is, 82 per
cent of the private listings in the sample were normal-interest properties,
compared to 80 per cent for auction listings. Seller selectivity (Heckman
1979) was formally tested with the probit model, using the listing choice
’
(private or auction) as the dependent variable, and the same independent
variables as in Equation 1, omitting days on the market. None of the
variables were significant, with only 53 per cent of the observations correctly
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classified. Note also that the possibility of an endogenous link between the
marketing choice and any of the variables in Equation 1 is not troubling with
respect to simultaneity, as the system is recursive.
F. Omitted Variables
A potentially more serious problem is that the marketing choice may be
associated with pricing variables omitted from Equation 1. If this is so, price
differences attributable to the omitted variables may have been improperly
attributed to the marketing choice. For example, Hansen (1986) found that
the association between the auction format and the selling price of timbering
rights (Mead, 1967, Mead, et. al, 1981) largely disappeared when variables
were included that proxied for such things as bidders' timber reserves.
Ideally, the possibility would be tested by adding quality-controlling variables
to the model, as in Krueger and Summers' (1988) analysis of inter-industry
wage differentials, or by using exogenous variables in a first stage regression
to predict the marketing choice, and then using the predicted choice in a
second stage regression. Additional data to instrument for marketing choice
are unavailable. The two most likely candidates are market interest on the
demand side and seller patience on the supply side. As pointed out, however,
they do not affect the choice, and in any case an argument can be made that
they belong on the right side of the pricing equation. This leaves only casual
evidence that omitted variables are not a serious empirical issue. First, it is
likely that the interest variable at least weakly proxies for omitted variables.
Second, if omitted variables are an issue, the empirically interesting cases are
first, if there are omitted variables which negatively affect price and are also
positively associated with the choice of a private sale, and second, if there are
omitted variables which positively affect price and are also positively
associated with the choice of an auction. However, given the interaction
result that private negotiations produce prices at least equal to those from
auctions for low-interest properties, the speculation that either of those cases
exists requires the unlikely assumption that they disappear for low-interest
properties and reappear for normal-interest properties.
Finally, the author inspected 50 of the sample properties, 40 of which had
been listed for sale by auction, the remaining 10 listed for private sale. No
discernible patterns of physical or locational differences were found. Listing
and selling agents had similar observations.
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G. The Puzzle of Market Segmentation
There remains the question of why a substantial percentage of sellers of
normal-interest properties choose private listings, and why a similar
percentage of sellers of below-normal interest properties choose auction
listings. One explanation for private listings of normal-interest properties is
that the expected variance of price is lower for private sales. Ex post
however, this was not the case. The coefficient of variation for the selling
prices of houses listed privately was 0.2932, compared with 0.3036 for houses
listed for sale by auction. For houses sold privately (including sales before
and after auction), the coefficient was 0.2956, compared with 0.3056 for
houses sold at auction. While these differences are in the direction
hypothesized, they are statistically trivial.
At the extreme, there is the risk of a no-sale. If the expectation was that a
larger percentage of auction listings than private listings would end in a no-
sale, this would be an explanation for the choice of a private listing.
However, surveys indicate that neither sellers nor buyers feel the chances of a
sale are influenced by the marketing choice (Maher, 1989a). At the same
time, those surveys provide other explanations for the choice of a private sale
for normal-interest properties. The most important is that 37.3 per cent of
sellers considered the commitment to pay advertising costs a disadvantage of
an auction listing. In addition, 31.3 per cent of sellers found the auction
process too stressful, and 18.1 per cent feared the ultimate impact of a failed
auction. Given these perceptions and the lack of prior evidence on price
differences, the dominant strategy is likely to be less than transparent.
With respect to explaining the choice of an auction listing for a below-normal
interest property, there is the fact that an auction listing comes with a target
date for sale, reducing perceived uncertainty about the variance of time on the
market. It is also likely that a below normal interest state-of-the-market may
not be as obvious to a seller as it is to an agent, and there may be reasons for
an agent to conceal this information or to minimize its importance. First, an
indication by an agent that there is likely to be a low level of interest could
jeopardize the chance to list the property. Second, the additional revenue
available to an agent from shifting advertising costs to a seller (and perhaps
retaining advertising discounts) may exceed the reduced commission from a
lower price. The fact that the percentage of properties listed for sale by
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auction and the percentage listed privately are approximately the same,
regardless of the agent's opinion of the level of market interest, is indirect
evidence that this may occur.
A related agency issue is the impact of brokers’ impatience. A defining
characteristic of private negotiations is the sequential bidding process which
forces the seller to accept or reject offers as they arrive. A decision is made
to sell, despite a positive probability that a higher offer will be forthcoming,
when the costs of waiting exceed the expected increase in price. The net
revenue to the agent is also affected by the seller's accept or reject decision.
An acceptance guarantees a (known) commission, while a rejection may or
may not lead to a higher price and a higher commission, and may mean
additional costs for advertising and other marketing efforts. Each rejection
also increases the chance that no sale will be made. Because the agent's
commission is a small fraction of the selling price, and because the agent
bears the marketing costs of a private sale, the expected value of rejecting an
offer in hopes of a higher bid is greater for a seller than for an agent.
Therefore, an agent may encourage the acceptance of an offer for a private
listing that might be rejected if it were made prior to an auction. This line of
reasoning may also help explain the large difference in prices brought at
auction and after auction, as well as the high percentage of houses that sell
shortly after a failed auction. Because agencies lose the exclusive right-to-
sell 30 days after a failed auction, they have incentive to produce an offer and
acceptance before then. Geltner, et al (1991) arrive at a similar conclusion
with respect to conflicts of interest between sellers and agents when
adjustments to prices are made as private sale listing agreements near
expiration.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Three propositions from bargaining theory were tested: 1) auctions should
produce different (higher) prices; 2) prices should be associated with the level
of market interest; and 3) prices should be associated with the level of seller
patience.
A comparison of prices brought by English auctions to prices brought by
private negotiations produced evidence that the pricing mechanism matters,
with the price-maximizing choice a function of the level of market interest.
Prices were also associated with the level of seller patience, regardless of the
marketing mechanism.
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In a sample of 309 houses sold from January 1, 1988, through March 31
,
1989, in suburbs of Melbourne, Australia, houses expected to generate at least
normal levels of interest which were listed for sale by auction and sold either
before or at auction brought a statistically significant price premium over
houses listed and sold privately, and over houses that went unsold at auction,
but were sold later privately. For houses expected to generate below-norrnal
levels of market interest, there was not a statistically significant difference in
the prices brought by auctions and private sales, though prices from private
sales were significantly higher than prices brought by sales after auction.
The analysis raises a number of questions, including the rationales of the
relatively high percentage of sellers who appear to make suboptimal
marketing choices, the impact ot the use of seller bids, and the use of secret
reserve prices, contrary to accepted auction theory. The agency issues
surrounding the marketing choice would seem a particularly promising area
for future research.
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